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TAX-HAVEN INCORPORATION FOR 
U.S.-HEADQUARTERED FIRMS: 
NO EXODUS YET
Eric J. Allen and Susan C. Morse
U.S. income tax rules may encourage a U.S.-headquartered multinational corpora-
tion (MNC) to adopt a structure with a tax haven parent. We study data from fi rms 
that conducted initial public offerings in the United States between 1997 and 2010 
and offer evidence that U.S.-headquartered MNCs rarely incorporate in tax havens. 
Of the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify, only 27 are incorporated 
in tax havens. Others have pointed to the recent increase in the proportion of fi rms 
conducting U.S. IPOs that incorporate in tax havens as possible evidence that 
more U.S.-headquartered MNCs make this decision. We show instead that Chinese-
headquartered fi rms drive this increase. 
Keywords: international taxation, initial public offerings, tax havens, headquar-
ters, incorporation
JEL Codes: H25, F23
I. INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations (MNCs) face the challenge of, and opportunity for, multijurisdictional tax planning (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Desai, 2009). One 
primary goal of multijurisdictional planning is to allocate as much taxable income as 
possible to low-tax jurisdictions, thereby minimizing corporate income tax (Clausing, 
2009). While all MNCs have the opportunity to take advantage of this strategy, MNCs 
with parent corporations incorporated outside the United States, and in particular in 
tax havens, may have more options available to them (Desai and Hines, 2002). This 
is because the U.S. corporate residence rule permits a fi rm incorporated outside the 
United States to avoid U.S. taxpayer status, even if it is headquartered and managed 
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in the United States (Shaviro, 2011). Therefore, using a tax-haven-incorporated parent 
may help U.S.-headquartered MNCs avoid the perceived burdens and anticompetitive 
features of the U.S. corporate tax system (Donmoyer, 1999; Samuels, 2009) and reduce 
tax on U.S. and non-U.S. income (U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury), 2002). 
As a result, prior researchers have predicted an increase in U.S.-headquartered fi rms 
incorporating in tax havens as a response to onerous U.S. federal income tax rules 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2010, Shaviro, 2011).
This paper considers the issue of the incorporation location choice of fi rms that conduct 
initial public offerings (IPOs) on U.S. markets. Specifi cally, it examines whether U.S.-
headquartered MNCs incorporate in tax havens prior to an IPO. We fi rst consider the 
hypothesis that U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate parent corporations in tax-haven 
jurisdictions, and fi nd that they rarely do so. In particular, only 27 fi rms, or about 3 
percent of the 918 U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify, incorporate in tax havens. 
We also briefl y consider the possibility that U.S.-headquartered MNCs may incorporate 
in non-U.S., non-tax-haven jurisdictions and fi nd only minimal evidence of this practice 
in our sample. We next consider whether U.S.-headquartered fi rms are responsible for 
the previously documented increase in the proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs 
that are incorporated in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010). We fi nd that fi rms 
headquartered in China and Hong Kong, as opposed to U.S.-headquartered fi rms, are 
largely responsible for the increase. Finally, we list and describe some features of the 
U.S.-headquartered fi rms that are incorporated in tax havens, and suggest possible 
directions for future research.
Section II discusses the different incorporation options for MNCs and the associated 
costs and benefi ts. Section III documents our study design, and section IV our results. 
Section V concludes.
II. U.S.-HEADQUARTERED MNCs’ INCORPORATION DECISIONS
A. U.S. versus Tax Haven Incorporation
A U.S.-headquartered MNC faces the choice of whether to incorporate its parent entity 
in the United States or in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. In this paper we focus on the choice 
between U.S. and tax-haven incorporation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that if 
a U.S.-headquartered fi rm incorporates outside the United States in response to onerous 
tax rules, it will do so in a tax haven. We consider fi rms’ incorporation decisions prior 
to the IPO rather than transactions involving inversions of stand-alone U.S.-parented 
fi rms into non-U.S.-parented structures. 
We begin by discussing the existing laws and incentives that affect U.S.-headquartered, 
U.S.-incorporated fi rms and U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms. We then 
consider the possibility that incentives to incorporate a tax haven parent have changed 
or will change over time. Finally, we discuss several non-tax considerations relevant 
to incorporation decisions.
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B. Tax Structure Options for U.S.-Headquartered MNCs
1. Taxation of MNCs with U.S. Parent
Corporations incorporated in the United States, for example in a U.S. state such as 
Delaware, are subject to U.S. federal income tax on worldwide income. Because the 
U.S. tax rules treat separately incorporated affi liates as separate taxpayers, non-U.S. 
corporate subsidiaries of a U.S. parent are not automatically required to pay U.S. federal 
income tax. However, a U.S.-parented MNC must currently pay U.S. tax on the income 
of its foreign subsidiaries to the extent it falls into “subpart F income” categories, which 
include certain mobile and passive income. When income is repatriated from non-U.S. 
corporate subsidiaries as dividend distributions, the dividends are included in the income 
of the U.S. parent. U.S. federal income tax imposed on repatriations, including subpart 
F inclusions and dividend distributions, is subject to reduction under applicable foreign 
tax credit rules. A proportion of foreign income taxes paid by non-U.S. corporate sub-
sidiaries is deemed paid by a U.S. parent upon the U.S. parent’s inclusion of subpart 
F income or dividend distributions, and these deemed paid foreign taxes can result in 
foreign tax credits (Isenbergh, 2009). 
Like all taxpayers, U.S-parented MNCs face an incentive to engage in tax planning 
to reduce or defer the amount of U.S. and non-U.S. tax they have to pay. International 
tax planning differs signifi cantly from fi rm to fi rm. However, a typical structure for 
a U.S.-parented MNC features a U.S. parent corporation, with one or more non-U.S. 
intermediate holding corporations incorporated in a tax haven or other low-tax juris-
diction, which are owned by the United States parent or by U.S. affi liates of the U.S. 
parent. The non-U.S. low-tax intermediate holding corporations then own one or more 
non-U.S. corporate operating subsidiaries (Fleming, Peroni, and Shay, 2009; Kleinbard, 
2011a). These structures are facilitated by “check-the-box” entity classifi cation rules 
fi nalized by the United States in 1996 (Kleinbard, 2011a).
U.S.-parented MNCs may take advantage of this type of structure by using transfer 
pricing to construct intercompany transactions in a way that allocates income to the 
low-tax intermediate holding corporation(s) rather than to the United States or other 
jurisdictions that assert the right to tax other members of the MNC corporate group. 
For example, profi t may be allocated to a low-tax intermediate holding affi liate because 
the low-tax affi liate is the owner, for tax purposes, of the MNC’s non-U.S. intellectual 
property (Shay, 2004). The sharing of research and development payments under the 
so-called “cost sharing” regulations and the transfer of intellectual property offshore 
at relatively low valuations under the so-called “buy-in” regulations facilitate the 
ownership of intellectual property by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Brauner, 2008). In addi-
tion, MNCs may structure intercompany transactions and external transactions such as 
contract manufacturing in a way that avoids the characterization of the low-tax affi li-
ate’s income as subpart F income. For example, the low-tax affi liate can be deemed to 
own a manufactured product throughout its manufacturing process until it is sold to a 
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customer (Roin, 2008). Strategies such as these may permit U.S.-parented MNCs to 
allocate not only non-U.S. income, but also U.S. income, to low-taxed non-U.S. affi liates, 
and conversely to allocate deductions to U.S. parents (Clausing, 2009; Grubert, 2012). 
U.S.-parented MNCs may also use foreign-tax-credit planning to ensure that their 
repatriations are sheltered from taxation. For example, they may choose to pay divi-
dends from high-taxed rather than low-taxed subsidiaries, generating higher deemed 
paid foreign taxes. This strategy can shield both dividends and payments other than 
dividends, such as royalties, from non-U.S. tax (Grubert and Altshuler, 2008). Such 
MNCs may also use structures that maximize benefi ts under bilateral income tax trea-
ties and non-U.S. tax laws and ensure that intercompany payments such as royalties 
and interest are not subject to non-U.S. withholding tax and/or are deductible under 
non-U.S. income tax law. In addition, alternatives to dividend repatriation, including 
intercompany loans and “blending” dividends from high-tax and low-tax affi liates, are 
correlated with the prospect of a high tax liability imposed on dividend repatriation 
(Altshuler and Grubert, 2002). 
As a result of this planning, prior research fi nds that U.S.-parented MNCs pay low 
rates of U.S. tax on non-U.S. income earned in non-U.S. subsidiaries. For example, in 
2007, U.S.-parented MNCs paid about $18.1 billion in U.S. tax with respect to non-
U.S. income. This represented an average 3.3 percent residual U.S. tax burden on such 
income based on 2007 Treasury tax return data (Costa and Gravelle, 2012).
Grubert and Mutti (2001) develop a broader model that calculates the U.S. tax burden 
on non-U.S. income in U.S.-parented MNC structures including not only taxes remitted 
but also “excess burden,” or deadweight loss. Using this model, based in part on 1992 
Treasury tax return data, Altshuler and Grubert (2001) estimate that the effective U.S. 
tax rate for the non-U.S. income of U.S.-parented MNCs is approximately 5.4 percent. 
This estimate includes a 1.7 percent “excess burden” deadweight loss generated by 
unrepatriated earnings in non-U.S. jurisdictions with an effective tax rate below 10 
percent, a result that is consistent with other research (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2001). 
Grubert and Altshuler (2008) have also raised the possibility that the “implicit costs of 
deferral” may be greater than 1.7 percent for some fi rms. 
Several costs contribute to the excess burden or deadweight loss of sequestering 
earnings offshore. For example, lower than optimal dividend payments may limit the 
ways in which earnings may be invested (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2001). Additionally, 
maintaining non-business assets offshore may increase a fi rm’s cost of capital (Bryant-
Kutcher, Eiler, and Guenther, 2008). Finally, the fi rm directly incurs tax planning costs 
including the expense of creating an offshore structure and maintaining multiple affi li-
ates and intercompany relationships and payments (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 1996). 
2. Taxation of MNCs with Tax-Haven Parent
An alternative structure features a MNC headquartered in the United States, but 
whose parent is incorporated in a tax haven that imposes a very low, often zero, rate 
of corporate income tax. The tax-haven parent typically owns a U.S. subsidiary that 
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houses the U.S. management and U.S. business operations of the fi rm, and also owns 
other subsidiaries incorporated in non-U.S. jurisdictions (Treasury, 2002). The U.S. 
rule for corporate tax residence turns on incorporation location, not on the location of 
management and control (Shaviro, 2011). As a result, a tax-haven-parented MNC avoids 
exposure to U.S. federal income tax on non-U.S. business income, including subpart F 
income, earned by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Desai and Hines, 2002). 
As mentioned earlier, a U.S.-parented MNC may attempt to allocate not only non-U.S. 
income, but also U.S. income, to low-taxed non-U.S. subsidiaries (Clausing, 2009; Gru-
bert, 2012). This allocation may lessen the value of tax-haven incorporation. However, 
tax-haven-parented fi rms, at least in some cases, have an advantage with respect to this 
kind of tax planning. Seida and Wempe (2004) and Desai and Hines (2002) suggest that 
a key benefi t of a successful tax-haven-parented MNC structure is the use of earnings-
stripping strategies, under which a U.S. subsidiary makes deductible interest or other 
payments to its tax-haven parent to reduce the amount of income subject to U.S. tax. 
In other words, a tax-haven-parented MNC structure may facilitate the reduction of 
tax on U.S. income compared to a U.S.-parented MNC structure. In recognition of this 
issue, a perennial U.S. legislative proposal would tighten anti-earnings-stripping rules 
for tax-haven-parented MNCs created in inversion transactions (Solomon, 2012). 
Prior research provides some evidence of the benefi ts provided by the tax-haven-
parented structure. Seida and Wempe (2004) fi nd evidence that earnings stripping by 
U.S. fi rms that inverted into tax-haven-parented structures, prior to the enactment of 
the 2004 anti-inversion rules, resulted in lower post-inversion effective tax rates for the 
inverted fi rms compared to a control sample. Cloyd, Mills, and Weaver (2003) fi nd no 
systematic increase in company valuation following the announcement of an inversion, 
but Desai and Hines (2002) observe that the markets exhibit more positive reactions 
to inversions in the presence of greater leverage. The research suggests that a tax-
haven-parented structure provides tangible tax savings to some fi rms, which investors 
positively value. 
Changing from a U.S.-parent to a tax-haven-parent structure is costly, as the applicable 
rules typically require shareholders to recognize gain (but prevent the recognition of 
loss) upon such an inversion (Treasury, 2002). Moreover, such a change is sometimes 
impossible. Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code, an anti-inversion provi-
sion enacted in 2004, a MNC is still treated as a U.S.-parented fi rm even after acquisition 
by a foreign corporation if: (1) at least 80 percent of the foreign corporation’s stock is 
owned by former owners of the U.S. parent (by reason of their former ownership of 
the U.S. parent); and (2) the fi rm lacks “substantial business activities” in the country 
in which the new foreign parent is incorporated (Vanderwolk, 2010). Strategic acquisi-
tions continue to provide a path to inversion (Wells, 2012). However, other recently 
used strategies, such as expatriation to a country where a fi rm arguably has substantial 
business activities (Webber, 2011) have been curtailed by recent regulations limiting 
the defi nition of substantial business activities.The diffi culty of changing incorporation 
location for an existing U.S.-incorporated fi rm may increase the incentive for fi rms to 
incorporate in a tax haven at inception.
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C. Increasing Tax-Haven Incorporation Incentives?
The differences between the federal taxation of U.S.-parented and tax-haven-parented 
MNCs are not new. But it has been argued that, over time, the differences have become 
more likely to lead to U.S.-headquartered MNCs opting for tax-haven parents, including 
at the time of initial incorporation (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011). One 
reason is the asserted increased ease, attributable to communications and other techno-
logical developments, of “decentering” companies, or placing fi nancial, organizational, 
and managerial “homes” in different countries (Desai, 2009, p. 1277). Another reason 
cited for an increased incentive for MNCs to incorporate outside the United States is 
that other countries have lowered their corporate income tax rates, relative to the United 
States, partially in an attempt to attract foreign direct investment (Altshuler and Grubert, 
2006; Shaviro, 2011). A comparison of the statutory corporate income tax rate imposed 
by the United States to the statutory rates imposed by other countries reveals that the 
top U.S. statutory rate of 35 percent substantially exceeds the mean Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) rate of 25 percent, and is much 
greater than the typical tax-haven rate of 0 percent (Sullivan, 2011). Another factor 
that fi rms may consider in connection with tax-haven incorporation is the possibility 
of future changes in U.S. tax law. For example, in the wake of perceived abuse of the 
cost-sharing and buy-in regulations mentioned above, the U.S. government adopted 
revised regulations that had the effect of allocating deductions away from a U.S. parent 
corporation (in the case of regulations applicable to stock option costs) or allocating 
income to a parent corporation (in the case of platform contribution transaction buy-in 
pricing regulations) (Nadal, 2009). Use of a tax-haven parent avoids the possibility that 
similar rules reducing the ability of a U.S. parent to shift profi ts to low-tax subsidiaries 
will adversely affect a fi rm. 
Another reform proposal would change the U.S. corporate income tax system to 
implement worldwide consolidation, or the current taxation of U.S.-parented MNCs 
on all of the income generated by non-U.S. subsidiaries (Kleinbard, 2011b), or at least 
on the income generated by low-taxed non-U.S. subsidiaries (White House and U.S. 
Treasury, 2012). Such a worldwide consolidation reform would not affect the U.S. 
federal income taxation of tax haven-parented MNCs.
However, there is also the risk that future tax laws may make tax-haven incorporation 
less desirable. For example, passage of a “managed and controlled” test for determining 
corporate residence could signifi cantly undermine the strategy of tax-haven incorpora-
tion (Kleinbard, 2011b). Alternatively, rules directed specifi cally at low-taxed parents 
of U.S. subsidiaries could undo much of the benefi t of, for example, earnings-stripping 
planning (Solomon, 2012). That said, a tax-haven-parented MNC could presumably 
domesticate and change into a U.S.-parented MNC if it concluded that the tax-haven-
parented structure no longer offered suffi cient advantages.
D. Non-tax Considerations
Non-tax incentives, most importantly capital markets and related corporate gover-
nance concerns, can also affect a fi rm’s choice of country of incorporation. Non-U.S. 
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incorporation does not offer the benefi t of access to Delaware corporate governance 
law (Kane and Rock, 2008), and this lack of access may translate into lower inves-
tor confi dence in management (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). Related research on the 
reasons for cross-listing indicates that cross-listed fi rms trade at a premium because 
their willingness to comply with stricter accounting, disclosure and other rules serves 
as a “bonding” signal that reassures investors about low agency costs (Litvak, 2007). 
More specifi c regulatory concerns may also play a role. Certain regulations, like 
those applicable to the airline industry, may favor U.S.-incorporated fi rms (Dobson and 
McKinney, 2009). On the other hand, incorporation outside the United States could 
facilitate listing outside the United States and the avoidance of some U.S. securities 
reporting requirements (Litvak, 2007), or could loosen applicable insurance regulations 
(Elliott, 2005) or shipping law requirements (Semerono, 2000). 
These non-tax considerations, together with opportunities for U.S.-incorporated 
fi rms to reduce U.S. tax under existing law, may affect the expected benefi ts of tax-
haven incorporation for some fi rms. However, as pointed out in other research (Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2010; Shaviro, 2011), tax-haven incorporation still appears to offer 
many fi rms the prospect of avoiding a small current U.S. tax on non-U.S. income and 
the possibility of eroding the U.S. tax base through earnings-stripping strategies. The 
question we engage is whether fi rms are taking advantage of this option. 
III. STUDY DESIGN  
A. Overview
As discussed above, U.S. tax rules may encourage a U.S.-headquartered MNC to adopt 
a tax-haven-parented structure. But to what extent have U.S.-headquartered MNCs in 
fact used tax-haven-parented structures, and has their use of these structures changed 
over time? These questions motivate our study. We seek to test two hypotheses. First, 
do U.S.-headquartered MNCs incorporate in tax havens prior to an IPO? Second, are 
U.S.-headquartered fi rms responsible for the previously documented increase in the 
proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs that are incorporated in tax havens?
B. Use of IPO Data to Study Incorporation Location Decision
Our study examines fi rms that conducted IPOs on U.S.-based exchanges between 
1997 and 2010. We choose this set of fi rms because: (1) it has been previously cited as 
support for the proposition that more U.S.-headquartered MNCs have begun to incor-
porate outside the United States, and in particular in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2010; Shaviro, 2011); (2) IPO fi lings contain not only data about incorporation location 
and listed headquarters, but also information that can be used to evaluate the “true” 
natural headquarters of a fi rm; (3) since IPO fi rms are often relatively young, use of 
the IPO sample allows us to observe the incorporation status of many fi rms relatively 
close to their original incorporation date; and (4) examining U.S. IPO fi rms will capture 
the U.S.-headquartered multinational population that we are interested in, under the 
assumption that MNCs are large enough to prioritize access to public equity markets.
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Selection bias affects our sample to a limited extent. First, our sample excludes fi rms 
that do not conduct an IPO. Therefore we are unable to observe the incorporation decisions 
of fi rms who fail, are acquired prior to listing, or remain private. We have little reason to 
think that fi rms that fail or experience a strategic acquisition are more likely to choose 
tax-haven incorporation compared to fi rms that conduct an IPO. But it is possible that 
that a fi rm that plans to stay private may be more likely to choose tax-haven incorpora-
tion compared to fi rms that conduct an IPO. For example, it is possible that corporate 
governance and shareholders’ rights offered by U.S. incorporation are more important 
for shareholders of a publicly held corporation than for owners of a closely held fi rm. 
A second source of potential bias is that, although our sample includes fi rms that 
conduct an IPO on a U.S. exchange simultaneously with an offering on a non-U.S. 
exchange, we do not examine the incorporation decisions of fi rms that do not list on a 
U.S. exchange. There has been a signifi cant drop in IPOs conducted on U.S. exchanges 
in recent years, and a concurrent increase on non-U.S. exchanges. If this dynamic is 
driven by U.S.-headquartered fi rms conducting their IPO on foreign markets, and these 
fi rms incorporate in tax havens, then our analysis would undercount the number of 
U.S.-headquartered fi rms that incorporate in tax havens.
In concurrent research, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stultz (2012) examine the drivers of the 
growth of IPOs outside of the U.S. They show that the number of fi rms conducting an 
IPO only outside of their domestic market has grown from 55 in 1990 to 734 in 2007, 
with the associated proceeds increasing from $8.8 billion to $168.8 billion. While the 
authors do not document the total number of U.S. fi rms in this group, they do show that 
U.S. fi rms that do not list on a U.S. market generate only 7 percent of the total proceeds 
from these issuances. They conclude that the growth of IPOs outside the United States 
is driven predominantly by non-U.S. fi rms conducting IPOs outside of U.S. exchanges. 
As a result, we do not believe our focus on U.S.-listed IPO fi rms omits a meaningful 
number of U.S.-headquartered MNCs.1
A fi nal limitation with our study design is that each observation in our data set typi-
cally relates to an incorporation decision taken several years prior to the IPO date and 
therefore lags incorporation decisions made in response to historical developments. As a 
result, any decisions made in response to legislative changes in the recent past will most 
likely not be refl ected in the data. For example, the observations of U.S-headquartered, 
tax-haven-incorporated fi rms are composed mainly of fi rms that incorporated prior 
to the 2004 enactment of I.R.C. Section 7874, which severely curtails the ability of a 
U.S.-parented MNC to invert into a non-U.S. parent structure.
 1 To provide additional evidence that U.S.-headquartered fi rms generally list on U.S. exchanges, we examined 
all fi rms that appear on the Compustat Fundamentals Annual (listed on North American Exchanges) and 
Global (international exchanges) databases for the sample period of 1997–2010. We identifi ed all fi rms 
coded as U.S.-headquartered in the two databases (5,665 fi rms) and observed that 99 percent (5,622 fi rms) 
are, according to the databases, listed on an exchange (item EXCHG for fundamentals annual, EXCHC 
for global) located in the United States. 
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C. Default Incorporation Jurisdiction Assumption
Others have identifi ed the challenge of identifying the counterfactual case of those 
fi rms that would have incorporated in the United States but for U.S. corporate tax rules 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2010). We address this problem by assuming that the default 
jurisdiction of incorporation is the headquarters jurisdiction of the fi rm. This is consistent 
with a body of related corporate governance literature that fi nds a signifi cant home-
state advantage and a largely binary incorporation location choice between the home 
state and Delaware for U.S. fi rms (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Daines, 2002). Thus a 
decision by a U.S. fi rm to incorporate in the United States indicates that corporate tax, 
regulatory or other incentives are not suffi cient to motivate non-U.S. incorporation. 
Alternatively, a decision by a U.S.-headquartered fi rm to incorporate in a tax-haven 
jurisdiction suggests that U.S. tax or other incentives are strong enough to motivate 
non-U.S. incorporation. 
D. Sample Construction and Identifi cation of Tax Havens
To build our sample, we collect a listing of all initial public offerings on a stock 
exchange in the United States from the Thomson Financial Services Database (also 
known as Securities Data Company (SDC)) between 1997 and 2010. Table 1 details 
the sample construction. Panel A documents our initial sample of 2,911 IPOs after 
screening for missing data and eliminating certain investment funds. Panel B docu-
ments our collection of U.S.-headquartered fi rms within the larger sample. We identify 
2,587 fi rms coded by SDC as U.S.-headquartered. We then examine the prospectuses 
of the 324 fi rms shown by SDC as headquartered elsewhere to ensure that the non-
U.S.-headquartered coding is correct.2 We classify all fi rms that disclose their principal 
offi ce or more than 50 percent of their employees, fl oor area, or revenue in the United 
States as being headquartered in the United States. This results in the identifi cation of 
35 additional U.S.-headquartered fi rms.
Panel C shows our identifi cation of U.S.-headquartered MNCs. We use informa-
tion provided by the 2011 Compustat fundamentals annual database to fi nd evidence 
of foreign operations. Table 1, panel C documents this process. Of the 2,622 U.S.-
headquartered IPO fi rms, we fi nd 918 fi rms that show evidence of global operations. 
We code a fi rm with the selected screens equal to “missing” as purely domestic. As 
it is likely that at least some of the “missing” fi rms have foreign revenues, but do not 
specifi cally break out geographic information in their segment disclosures, we are likely 
undercounting the true number of MNCs. 
 2 The SDC “Nation” coding generally simply refers to the principal executive offi ce listing on the face of 
the registration statement, which may not refl ect a fi rm’s strongest business nexus. Of the 302 non-U.S.-
incorporated fi rms for which we hand-collected principal executive offi ce data, 277, or 92 percent, listed 
a principal executive offi ce country that was the same as the SDC “Nation” code. 
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Table 1
Sample Construction
Panel A: Total Sample
Total U.S. IPOs, between 1997–2010, from SDC 3,939
Less:
 Non-original IPOs –55
 Duplicate entries –18
 Firms for which we could not obtain the country of incorporation –259
 SIC code fi lters:
  6000–6199: Depository and non-depository credit institutions –144
  6722: Open-end management investment offi ces –2
  6726: Closed-end management investment offi ces –420
  6798: Real estate investment funds –107
  6799: Other investors –23
Initial sample 2,911
Panel B: Construction of U.S.-headquartered Sample
Total U.S.-headquartered Firms per SDC Coding          2,587 
Added from review of prospectuses:
 Principal executive offi ce listed = U.S. 1
 More than 50% U.S. revenue 24
 More than 50% fl oor area in U.S. 9
 More than 50% U.S. employees 1
Total U.S.-headquartered Firms 2,622
Panel C: Constructions of U.S.-headquartered MNC Sample
Total U.S.-headquartered Firms          2,622 
Number that could be Identifi ed in Compustat          2,465 
U.S.-headquartered Firms with Non-missing, Non-zero Amounts 
in the Year of IPO or any of the Subsequent Three Years:
 Pre-tax foreign income 588
 Foreign deferred taxes 127
 Foreign income tax expense 203
Total U.S.-headquartered Multinational Companies 918
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Notes: Firms identifi ed as U.S.-headquartered MNCs in Panel C are used for the analysis in Table 2. 
Firms identifi ed as U.S.-headquartered MNCs in Panel C and that also provide information regarding 
pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) and total pre-tax income (PI) are segregated for the analysis in Table 4.
Sources:
Panel A:
 We obtain a listing of all Initial public offerings in the United States from the Thomson Financial Services 
Database (Securities Data Company (SDC)) between 1997 and 2010. This results in 3,939 offerings. 
From SDC we obtain the fi rm name, issue date, SIC code, country of incorporation (item “Country of 
Incorporation” or “State of Incorporation”), and headquarters country (item “Nation”). We eliminate all 
offerings which were not the fi rms’ initial IPO (SDC category “Original IPO” equal to “No”), as well 
as 18 offerings that are duplicated in the database. We note 899 offerings that are missing the country of 
incorporation in SDC. For these offerings we manually review the fi rms’ prospectus (i.e. form S-1, F-1, 
S-11, N-2, etc.) to collect the country of incorporation at the time of offering. We obtain this information 
for all but 259 of the offerings. We also eliminate all depository and non-depository credit institutions 
(SIC Codes 6000–6199), real estate investment trusts (6798), closed-end management investment offi ces 
(6726), open-end management investment offi ces (6722), and other investors (6799). This leaves us with 
2,911 fi rms with the countries of headquarters and incorporation identifi ed. 
Panel B: 
We note that SDC typically uses the address given by the fi rm as the principal executive offi ce to de-
termine the headquarters country. To expand the defi nition of U.S.-headquartered fi rms, we review the 
prospectuses for all 324 fi rms not incorporated in the United States to fi nd evidence that the fi rm is ef-
fectively domiciled in the United States. We apply four screens to make this determination: (1) address of 
the principal executive offi ce; (2) percentage of employees located in the United States; (3) percentage of 
fl oor area located in the United States; and (4) percentage of revenue generated in the United States. For 
the last three screens, if the percentage is greater than 50%, we code the fi rm as having a headquarters in 
the United States. This results in coding an additional 35 fi rms as U.S.-headquartered.
Panel C: 
We use the fi rm’s CUSIP number from SDC to obtain the GVKEY from the 2011 version of the Compustat 
fundamentals annual database. For fi rms that could not be identifi ed in this manner we collect the CIK 
number from the SEC’s EDGAR database and use it to identify the GVKEY in Compustat. For each fi rm 
we obtain the ending total assets (item AT), closing share price (PRCC_F), common shares (CSHO), and 
net income (NI) for the fi rst fi scal year end after the conclusion of the IPO. We require that each fi rm have 
non-missing item AT for inclusion in the sample, leaving 2,465 fi rms available for analysis. For these 
fi rms we code each that reports a non-zero amount of pre-tax foreign income (Compustat item PIFO), 
foreign deferred tax liability (item TXDFO), or foreign tax expense (item TXFO) in the year of IPO or 
the subsequent three years as having foreign operations. If all of those amounts are zero or missing we 
code the fi rm as having solely domestic income.
Table 1 (continued)
Sample Construction
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IV. RESULTS
A. Summary  
Our results are divided into three sections. First, we report the frequency with which 
U.S.-headquartered MNCs in our data set incorporate in tax-haven jurisdictions. We 
consider a fi rm to be incorporated in a tax haven if the incorporation country is classifi ed 
as such by Dharmapala and Hines (2009).3 We also show descriptive data comparing 
U.S.-headquartered MNCs with tax-haven-incorporated parents to U.S.-headquartered 
MNCs with U.S.-incorporated parents. Second, we examine the previously noted 
increase of U.S.-listed IPO fi rms incorporating in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2010), and document where the fi rms driving this increase are headquartered. Finally, 
we list and describe the characteristics of the U.S.-headquartered fi rms that we fi nd are 
important in the decision to incorporate in a tax-haven jurisdiction. 
B. U.S.-Headquartered MNCs Overwhelmingly Incorporate in the United States
In this paper, we generally consider U.S.-headquartered fi rms’ incorporation deci-
sions as a binary choice between U.S. incorporation and tax-haven incorporation. A 
third choice, non-U.S., non-tax-haven incorporation, is also an option. Some anecdotal 
evidence of recent examples of the approach of non-U.S., non-tax-haven incorporation 
exists (Webber, 2011). Before turning to the United States-versus-tax-haven choice, 
we briefl y consider the possibility that multinational fi rms in our sample choose to 
incorporate outside the United States, but not in tax havens, by examining the 918 
U.S.-headquartered MNCs that we identify. 
Table 2 presents the results. Of the 918 identifi ed U.S.-headquartered MNCs in the 
sample, 44 incorporate outside the United States. Of these 44 fi rms, 17, or 2 percent 
of the total sample, incorporate in a non-U.S. country that is not a tax haven.4 Israel 
is the only non-tax-haven country with more than a 1 percent share of the fi rms that 
incorporate outside the United States. Therefore, while the results indicate that a U.S.-
headquartered MNC is overwhelmingly likely to incorporate in the United States, if it 
does not, it is most likely to incorporate in a tax haven. 
 3 The Dharmapala and Hines list represents the consolidation of two different lists, one from Hines and 
Rice (1994) and one from an OECD (2000) report. A fi rm is classifi ed as being incorporated in a tax haven 
jurisdiction if the 2-digit country code corresponds to a country listed as a tax haven (Dharmapala and 
Hines, 2009). These countries are: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, 
Dominica, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Ireland, Isle of Man, Jordan, Lebanon,  Liberia, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Macao, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Nauru, Netherland Antilles, 
Niue, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, 
Seychelles, Singapore, Switzerland, Tonga, Turks and Caicos Islands, Vanuatu, and Virgin Islands (U.S.).
 4 We obtain similar fi gures when we consider the total sample of U.S.-headquartered fi rms without control-
ling for MNC status: only 69 fi rms, or 2.6 percent of the larger sample, incorporate outside the United 
States and 22 of these 69 fi rms incorporate in a non-U.S., non-tax-haven location.
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We focus the remainder of our analysis on the choice between tax-haven and U.S. 
incorporation. This focus not only includes the majority of non-U.S. incorporation 
location choices made by U.S.-headquartered MNCs, but also responds directly to 
the prediction of an increase in U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms as 
a result of onerous U.S. federal income tax rules (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010; Sha-
viro, 2011). Table 3 shows the number of MNCs headquartered in the United States 
that incorporate in a tax haven compared to the total number of MNCs headquartered 
in the United States and incorporated in the United States or a tax haven. Table 3’s 
analysis does not include the 17 MNCs headquartered in the U.S. and incorporated in 
non-U.S., non-tax-haven locations. The overall number of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms 
in this subsample of issuers is only 27 out of 901, or 3 percent. Even if we assume that 
the additional 20 tax-haven fi rms that were missing evidence of foreign operations in 
Compustat are multinationals, and that no non-tax-haven fi rms missing information were 
multinationals, the percentage of U.S.-headquartered MNCs that choose to incorporate 
in tax havens would only increase to just over 5 percent. 
In some years, the percentage of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms is higher. For example, 
it is 16 percent in 2002 and 9 percent in 2009. However, in both of those years, the 
absolute number of tax-haven fi rms is only three and two, respectively. The higher per-
centage in those years refl ects the low number of total IPOs as opposed to an increase 
in the occurrence of U.S. MNCs incorporating in tax havens. The results indicate that 
U.S.-headquartered MNCs have not made the decision to incorporate in tax havens 
prior to an IPO in signifi cant numbers.
As noted in Panel C of Table 1, of the 918 multinational, U.S.-headquartered IPO 
fi rms that we identify, 588 have suffi cient information about non-U.S. income to permit a 
comparison of the fi nancial characteristics of different fi rms. In keeping with our binary 
Table 2
Incorporation Locations of U.S.-Headquartered MNCs 
Country of Incorporation Number Percentage of Total 
United States 874 95
Tax Haven  27 3
Israel  10 1
Canada   3 0.3
Netherlands   2 0.2
Germany   1 0.1
Philippines   1 0.1
Total 918
Notes: See Table 1 for sample description. A fi rm is classifi ed as incorporated in a tax haven juris-
diction if the 2 digit country code corresponds to a country listed as a tax haven by Dharmapala 
and Hines (2009, p. 1067); see footnote 3 for a list of these countries. 
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comparison, we focus on a subsample of 575 fi rms that are incorporated either in a tax 
haven or in the United States for the analysis. As Table 4 shows, 19 of these 575 fi rms 
are incorporated in a tax haven. Compared to fi rms not incorporated in tax havens, 
the tax-haven fi rms have signifi cantly larger average assets (ASSETSt of $1.7 billion 
versus about $800 million) and market capitalization (SIZEt of $3.1 billion versus $1.3 
billion). They are also more profi table, as average return on assets (INCt) in the year of 
the IPO is 0.03 versus –0.04 for the U.S.-incorporated fi rms. Our data show research 
and development intensity (R&D) that is slightly higher for U.S.-incorporated fi rms, 
but this difference is not statistically signifi cant. 
Finally, the tax-haven incorporated fi rms have a higher ratio of foreign income to 
total income (FORINC of 0.64 versus 0.23). This suggests that the U.S.-headquartered 
fi rms that incorporate in tax havens are the fi rms that expect to realize relatively larger 
benefi ts from the reduction of U.S. tax on their non-U.S., and perhaps also their U.S., 
Table 3
Comparison of U.S-Headquartered MNCs that Incorporate in Tax 
Havens to Total U.S.-Headquartered MNCs that Incorporate in the 
United States or in Tax Havens
Incorporated in a Tax Haven
Year Total  Number Percentage 
1997 139  3  2
1998  78  0  0
1999 127  1  1
2000 120  4  3
2001  37  1  3
2002  19  3 16
2003  22  1  5
2004  74  1  1
2005  65  3  5
2006  70  3  4
2007  80  3  4
2008   8  0  0
2009  23  2  9
2010  39   2  5
901 27  3
Notes: See Table 1 for the sample description and footnote 3 for the list of tax havens.
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income. However, the results also show that U.S.-incorporated MNCs still exhibit 
material foreign operations (FORINC of 0.23) which indicates that there may be a 
substantial number of U.S.-headquartered fi rms that could reap some tax benefi ts from 
incorporating in a tax haven, yet do not make that choice. 
C. Chinese- and Hong Kong-Headquartered Firms Drive Increase in Tax-Haven-
   Incorporation Trend
We next examine the hypothesis that U.S.-headquartered fi rms are responsible for 
the previously documented increase in the proportion of fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs 
that are incorporated in tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala, 2010). We use the larger 
sample of all U.S. IPOs from 1997–2010, as shown in panel A of Table 1, to consider 
this question. The use of the larger sample, not screened for evidence of multinational 
activity, is consistent with the approach in Desai and Dharmapala. 
Table 4 
Mean Values for Selected Financial Variables for MNCs 
Headquartered in the United States
($Million)
Incorporation Location
Variable US Tax Haven Difference
ASSETSt 832.9 1,725.4 892.5**
SIZEt 1,295.9 3,141.2 1,845.3*
INCt –0.04 0.03 –0.07*
FORINC 0.23 0.64 –0.41***
RD 0.09 0.05 0.03
N 556 19
Notes: Asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% 
(*) levels. Signifi cance is calculated using Satterthwaite standard errors. 
See Table 1 for the sample description, and footnote 3 for the list of tax 
havens. Variable defi nitions are as follows: ASSETSt is the total assets at 
the end of year t (item AT ); SIZE is the price per share at the end of the 
year (PRCC_F ) multiplied by common shares outstanding (CSHO); INCt 
is net income (NI )/AT; FORINC is the average of pre-tax foreign income 
(PIFO) divided by total pre-tax income (PI) from years t to t+3; and RD 
is Research and Developent Expense (XRD) divided by ending total assets 
(AT ) in the year of IPO. If XRD is missing, we code XRD as equal to zero. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
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Table 5 provides a breakdown of the U.S. IPO fi rms that incorporate in tax havens. 
We fi nd that Chinese-, Greek-, and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms are responsible 
for about 60 percent of the instances of tax-haven-incorporated fi rms conducting U.S. 
IPOs. Chinese- and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms make up more than half of such 
fi rms, or 111 out of 210. 
Figure 1 duplicates the results obtained by Desai and Dharmapala (2010) and shows 
that the proportion of U.S. IPO fi rms incorporated in tax havens increased dramatically 
around 2002. But, as Figure 1 also shows, the frequency of U.S.-headquartered fi rms 
incorporating in tax havens has increased only slightly over our sample period. Chinese- 
and Hong Kong-headquartered issuers, not U.S.-headquartered issuers, drive the recent 
dramatic proportional increase in tax-haven-incorporated fi rms conducting U.S. IPOs.
The fi nding that Chinese- and Hong Kong-headquartered fi rms regularly incorporate 
in tax-haven jurisdictions5 has possible relevance to future research about whether 
U.S.-headquartered fi rms might at some point begin to regularly incorporate in tax 
havens or, more generally, outside the United States. In the case of Chinese- and Hong 
Kong-headquartered fi rms, there are several non-tax reasons that may support tax haven 
incorporation. These include legislative restrictions relating to foreign ownership of 
Chinese-incorporated fi rms, shareholder and creditor rights, listing approval, and foreign 
exchange convertibility (Howson and Khanna, 2010). In addition, the high quality and 
Table 5
Breakdown of the Headquarters Location of Firms 
that Incorporate in Tax Havens
Country HQ Number
Percentage 
of Total
China  98 47
United States  47 22
Greece  16 8
Hong Kong  13 6
Other  36 17
Total 210
Notes: No other country comprises more than 1 percent of the tax-haven 
sample. See Table 1 for the sample description, and footnote 3 for the list 
of tax havens.
 5 We also fi nd that Chinese and Hong Kong fi rms are responsible for more than half (124 out of 243) of the 
instances of corporations incorporating outside their headquarters jurisdiction — whether or not in a tax 
haven — and that the overwhelming majority (111 out of 124) of those instances involve incorporation in 
a tax haven. 
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fl exibility of tax havens’ corporate governance regimes may increase the attractiveness 
of tax-haven incorporation (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009). 
Tax considerations may also play a role. First, the tax savings attributable to tax havens’ 
low or zero corporate tax rates increases the likelihood of tax-haven incorporation rather 
than incorporation in the U.S. or other countries. Domestic tax issues may also have 
relevance. Prior to the repeal of Chinese foreign direct investment incentives in 2007, 
Chinese investors had an incentive to “round-trip” their capital into China using non-
Chinese investment vehicles to take advantage of these incentives (Li, 2007). Even after 
Figure 1
Ratios of Tax-Haven-Incorporated Issuers to Total Issuers
Notes: The total sample trend line has a slope of 0.018 (t-value=8.33***), the  “no China or Hong Kong 
HQ” trend line has a slope of 0.004 (t-value=3.93***), and the “U.S.-headquarters only” trend line has 
a slope of 1.06, where three asterisks denote signifi cance at the 1% level. See Table 1 for the sample 
description.
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the repeal of this law, advisors may still continue to use tax-haven-parented corporate 
structures because of habit or path dependence. 
With the above discussion we are not attempting to conclusively answer the ques-
tion as to why Chinese- and Hong Kong-based fi rms have increasingly incorporated in 
tax havens. Rather, by introducing possible reasons for this development we hope to 
suggest directions for future research into the question of why some fi rms incorporate 
in tax havens, and others do not.
D. U.S.-Headquartered, Tax-Haven-Incorporated Firms
We identify 47 U.S.-headquartered, tax-haven-incorporated fi rms in our larger sample 
of 2,911 MNCs.6 Table 6 lists these fi rms. In each case, a number of tax and non-tax 
decisions could have infl uenced the tax-haven-incorporation decision. We do not claim 
that tax considerations were the predominant driver for any of these fi rms’ incorpora-
tion decision. Rather, we propose that the existence of these 47 fi rms leaves open the 
possibility that tax advantages of tax-haven incorporation may be infl uential factors in 
incorporation decisions for at least some fi rms. Of these 47 fi rms, 17 incorporated in, 
or after, 2004, the year in which the U.S. enacted stringent anti-inversion legislation.
First, we observe a tendency of U.S.-headquartered corporations in particular lines 
of business, such as insurance or marine transportation, to incorporate in tax-haven 
locations. Of the 47 fi rms, 13 are insurance carriers, and four are engaged in marine 
transportation. For both of these industries, specifi c and favorable tax provisions sug-
gest that corporate tax incentives provide some of the reasons for fi rms’ choice of 
tax-haven-parented structures. 
In the case of insurance, it is possible for a tax-haven parent to minimize taxation on 
passive portfolio income such as interest and dividends, in part because of the low or 
zero tax-haven rate. A tax-haven parent may also avoid having any business income 
taxed by the United States and may arrange for the U.S. subsidiary to make deduct-
ible payments to the tax-haven parent, thus eroding the income tax base of the U.S. 
subsidiary. If the tax-haven parent is incorporated in Bermuda, the goal of avoiding 
taxation of the tax-haven parent by the United States may be facilitated by tax treaties 
that permit the use of a taxpayer-favorable permanent establishment provision specifi -
cally applicable to the insurance business (Elliott, 2005). Section 4371 of the Internal 
Revenue Code imposes excise taxes on premiums paid to a foreign insurer of 4 percent 
for some policy types including property and casualty and 1 percent for reinsurance and 
other policy types including life insurance. These excise taxes are subject to reduction 
under tax treaties, although IRS guidance limits the extent to which tax treaty relief can 
be claimed (Ocasal, Miles, and Tello, 2009). In some cases, premiums paid to a foreign 
reinsurer may escape state excise tax; non-tax regulatory concerns, such as the possibil-
ity of relaxed investment requirements, may also encourage tax-haven incorporation 
for some insurance fi rms (Bissell, 2003).
 6 Largely because of missing data fi elds, not all of these 47 fi rms appear in our subsample of 918 U.S.-
headquartered multinational fi rms. We manually collect incorporation year data for these 47 fi rms from 
publicly available documents.
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Table 6
U.S.-Headquartered, Tax-Haven-Incorporated U.S.-IPO Firms, 1997–2010
Name
Incorporation
Year IPO Date Industry
Accenture Ltd. 2001 7/18/01 Business Services
Aircastle Ltd. 2004 8/7/06 Business Services
Alcon Inc. 1971 3/20/02 Instruments and Related
Products
Amdocs Ltd. 1988 6/19/98 Business Services
American Safety 
Insurance Group
Ltd.
1986 2/13/98 Insurance Agents, Brokers, and
Service
Apex Silver Mines Ltd. 1996 11/25/97 Metal Mining
Aspen Insurance 
Holdings Ltd.
2002 12/3/03 Insurance Carriers
Assured Guaranty Ltd. 2003 9/29/04 Insurance Carriers
Avago Technologies 
Ltd.
2005 8/5/09 Electronic and Other
Equipment
Baltic Trading Ltd. 2009 3/9/10 Water Transportation
Bunge Ltd. 1995 8/1/01 Food and Kindred Products
CastlePoint Holdings 
Ltd.
2005 3/22/07 Insurance Carriers
CDC Software Corp. 2009 8/5/09 Business Services
CRM Holdings Ltd. 2005 12/20/05 Insurance Carries
Eagle Bulk Shipping 
Inc.
2005 6/22/05 Water Transportation
Fabrinet 1999 6/24/10 Electronic and Other
Equipment
FGX International 
Holdings Ltd.
2004 10/24/07 Instruments and Related
Products
Flagstone Reinsurance 
Holdings Ltd.
2005 3/29/07 Insurance Carriers
Fresh Del Monte  
Produce Ltd.
1996 10/23/97 Food and Kindred Products
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Name
Incorporation
Year IPO Date Industry
Garmin Ltd. 2000 12/8/00 Instruments and Related
Products
Genco Shipping and 
Trading Ltd.
2004 7/21/05 Water Transportation
General Maritime Corp. 2001 6/12/01 Water Transportation
Global Crossing Ltd. 1997 8/13/98 Communication
Greenlight Capital Re 2004 5/24/07 Insurance Carriers
Herbalife Ltd. 2002 12/15/04 Wholesale Trade
interWAVE 
Communications
International Ltd.
1994 1/28/00 Electronic and Other
Equipment
Iridium World 
Communications Ltd.
1996 6/9/97 Communication
Lazard Ltd. 2004 5/4/05 Security and Commodity
Brokers
Marvell Technology 
Group Ltd.
1995 6/26/00 Electronic and Other
Equipment
Max Re Capital Ltd. 1999 8/13/01 Insurance Carriers
MF Global Ltd. 2007 7/18/07 Security and Commodity
Brokers
Montpelier Re Holdings 2001 10/9/02 Insurance Carriers
OneBeacon Insurance
Group Ltd.
2006 11/8/06 Insurance Carriers
Open TV Corp 1999 11/23/99 Business Services
Platinum Underwriters
Holdings Ltd.
2002 10/28/02 Insurance Carriers
Primus Guaranty Ltd. 1998 9/26/04 Security and Commodity
Brokers
RSL Communications 
Ltd.
1996 9/30/97 Communication
Table 6 (continued)
U.S.-Headquartered, Tax-Haven-Incorporated U.S.-IPO Firms, 1997–2010
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Shipping companies with tax-haven parents can take advantage of a different pro-
vision of U.S. law, which exempts income from the international operation of a ship 
from U.S. income tax if earned by a foreign corporation resident in a country that 
declines to tax similar income earned by U.S. corporations (Glicklich and Miller, 
2012). Regulatory reasons may also encourage the use of non-U.S. shipping fl ags for 
certain types of shipping businesses. U.S. statutory law limits some commerce, such 
as “coastwise” shipping between two U.S. ports, to U.S.-fl agged vessels. For com-
merce not so limited, non-U.S. registration may provide an advantage for non-tax 
regulatory reasons including possible avoidance of applicable labor regulations, union 
contracts, and requirements to use U.S. shipyards for vessel construction (Semenoro, 
2000) as well as avoiding exposure to the choice of law doctrine that may require a 
U.S. forum in the event of worker injury for a U.S.-registered ship (Gilmore and Black, 
1975). 
Other companies, not in the insurance or shipping industries, appear to have made an 
internal decision to incorporate in tax havens. These include Accenture Ltd., the Arthur 
Name
Incorporation
Year IPO Date Industry
Santa Fe International
Corp.
1990 6/9/97 Oil and Gas Extraction
SeaCube Container 
Leasing Ltd.
2010 10/27/10 Business Services
Seagate Technology
Holdings
2000 12/10/02 Industrial Machinery and
Equipment
Stirling Cooke Brown
Holdings Ltd.
1995 11/25/97 Insurance Carriers
TyCom Ltd. 2000 7/26/00 Communication
United National Group 
Ltd.
2003 12/15/03 Insurance Carriers
UTi Worldwide Inc. 1995 11/2/00 Transportation Services
Validus Holdings Ltd. 2005 7/24/07 Insurance Carriers
Vistaprint Ltd. 2002 9/29/05 Printing and Publishing
Warner Chilcott 
Holdings Co. Ltd.
2004 9/20/06 Chemicals and Allied
Products
Table 6 (continued)
U.S.-Headquartered, Tax-Haven-Incorporated U.S.-IPO Firms, 1997–2010
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Andersen consulting spinoff, Lazard Ltd., the investment bank, and TyCom Ltd., a 
spinoff from Tyco International, which had previously expatriated (Desai and Hines, 
2002). They also include Fresh Del Monte Produce Ltd. and Bunge Ltd., companies 
with signifi cant agricultural operations outside the United States. 
Finally, several of the companies we study conducted IPOs after a going-private 
transaction previously established a tax-haven parent. These include Seagate Technol-
ogy Holdings and Herbalife Ltd. The going-private transactions highlight the possibility 
that market participants such as private equity investors, or advisors such as particular 
law fi rms or investment banks, infl uence the decision to incorporate in a tax haven. 
Analogous market participant infl uence appears to affect some other fi rm decisions, 
such as those relating to takeover defense (Coates, 2001) and the use of “supercharged 
IPO” structures (Fleischer and Staudt, 2012).
There are at least two interesting aspects of the market participant story. First, it is 
possible that some market participants have specifi c interests or priorities that encour-
age tax-haven incorporation. Private equity fi rms might prioritize tax savings over 
corporate governance protections, for example. Second, if the decision to incorporate 
in a tax haven is mediated by communities of market participants, or their advisors 
that share advice and norms and imitate structures, this may affect how a change in 
behavior might come about. For example, a change in U.S.-based startups’ incorpora-
tion decisions may gather momentum quickly if an infl uential group of investors or 
advisors concludes that the default jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. startups should 
be outside the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
Using data on fi rms conducting IPOs in the United States between 1997 and 2010, 
we examine two hypotheses. First, we consider whether U.S.-headquartered MNCs 
incorporate in tax havens, and provide evidence that they do not. Out of the 918 U.S.-
headquartered MNCs that we identify, only 27 incorporate in tax havens. This suggests 
that some fi rms that could benefi t from tax savings provided by tax-haven incorporation 
do not take advantage of this strategy. 
Second, we test the hypothesis, suggested in Desai and Dharmapala (2010), that a 
recent increase in the proportion of U.S. IPO fi rms incorporated in tax havens shows 
that U.S.-headquartered fi rms have increasingly begun to incorporate in tax havens. 
To test this second hypothesis, we use a larger sample of 2,911 fi rms. We fi nd that the 
proportion of fi rms conducting IPOs in the United States that are incorporated in tax 
havens began to increase around 2002, consistent with Desai and Dharmapala. However, 
we fi nd that only 47 U.S.-headquartered fi rms incorporate in a tax haven, and that fi rms 
headquartered outside the United States, in particular, in China and Hong Kong, drive 
the trend of increasing incorporation in tax havens. 
Future research might focus on providing a better idea of how fi rms make incorporation 
location decisions. In particular, better defi ning how capital formation and home or host 
country corporate governance and regulatory regimes impact the choice of incorpora-
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tion would help provide a better framework for evaluating how tax regimes infl uence 
incorporation location choice. Additionally, studying institutional factors, such as the 
variance of incorporation location choice cross-sectionally across industries, may help 
predict how fi rms will respond to changes in tax or other rules. 
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